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Epistemic Game of Thrones
Abstract
The aim of this paper is rather modest: I want to provide an account of some of the most re­
cent developments in epistemology, characterized by a certain shift that has been going on 
for some time now. This shift is best explained as the abandonment of traditional, monistic 
picture (according to which knowledge is the only important achievement in our attempt to 
cognitively grasp the world), and the acceptance of pluralism (according to which there are 
other important cognitive achievements we should strive for, most notably understanding 
and wisdom). One of the crucial aspects of this shift is the question about which cognitive 
state inherits knowledge as the prime epistemic value, and this is the aspect I will be mostly 
interested in. I will claim that the pluralistic picture fits much better into our cognitive 
engagement with the world, with other people, and with ourselves. In that sense, rather 
than rooting for one value as the holder of the epistemic throne, we should acknowledge the 
irreplaceable contribution that each has for our attempts to come to terms with who we are 
and with our experience of the world.
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1. Epistemic aims and values: 
  monism vs. pluralism
Writing	 about	 the	 task	 epistemology	 has	 traditionally	 been	 committed	 to,	
Marian	David	says:
“Epistemologists	of	all	persuasions	tend	to	invoke	the	goal	of	obtaining	truth	and	avoiding	error.	
This	goal	seems	to	be	of	specific	interest	to	epistemology.	No	other	goal	is	invoked	as	frequently	
as	this	one.	No	other	goal	is	given	as	much	weight	or	is	treated	with	as	much	respect	as	this	one.”	
(David	2001,	p.	151)
David	here	expresses	the	traditional,	monist	view	on	what	is	our	epistemic	
goal:	reaching	truth.	Whether	it	is	the	question	of	what	is	morally	right	or	
wrong,	of	whether	there	are	doors	in	front	of	me	or	whether	there	is	a	cat	
on	the	mat,	once	we	pose	these	questions,	we	want	to	get	to	the	right	an-
swer.	In	case	you	wonder	why,	explanations	are	many.	Philosophers	of	the	
ancient	times	would	tell	you	that	we	simply	cannot	live	a	life	of	happiness	
and	tranquillity,	or	good	life,	without	having	the	knowledge	of	reality,	and	
all	 of	 its	 portions.	Descartes	would	 tell	 you	 that	 our	 inquiring	minds	de-
mand	of	us	to	examine	our	knowledge	and	see	what	we	can	know.	Aristotle	
would	have	us	convinced	that	we	are	simply	drawn	to	asking	questions	and	
we	want	to	know	the	right	answers.	Truth	is	in	this	sense	intrinsically	good	
and	desired	for	its	own	sake,	whether	it	has	to	do	with	listening	to	the	latest	
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gossip	about	celebrities,	counting	the	glades	of	grass	in	one’s	background,	
inquiring	about	the	nature	of	beauty	or	trying	to	decide	on	the	right	course	
of	action.
Of	course,	trying	to	get	to	the	truth	always	brings	in	the	possibility	of	failing	
in	one’s	attempts,	for	various	reasons.	Sceptics	worn	us	about	the	impossibil-
ity	of	ever	disproving	sceptical	scenarios,	but	even	with	lesser	demands	on	
us,	 it	still	seems	we	are	constantly	falling	behind	our	desire	 to	reach	 truth.	
We	might	be	tired	or	in	a	hurry	and	therefore	fail	to	see	or	consider	a	relevant	
piece	of	evidence,	we	might	be	deceived	by	dishonest	informer	who	never-
theless	seems	reliable,	we	may	err	due	to	be	bad	luck	regardless	of	all	of	our	
best	efforts	to	be	the	best	cognizers	we	can	be.	This	means	we	are	constantly	
open	 to	errors.	 In	 fact,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	goal	of	 reaching	 truth	 implies	 that	
of	avoiding	error,	the	two	come	hand	in	hand.	Wayne	Riggs	calls	this	Twin	
Goods	View:
“There	are	exactly	two	goods	that	are	distinctly	and	purely	cognitive	or	epistemic.	They	are	(1)	
having	true	beliefs	and	(2)	avoiding	false	beliefs.”	(Riggs	2002)
Given	the	way	our	epistemic	goal	is	defined,	all	the	epistemological	assess-
ments	(whether	of	individual	belief,	sets	of	belief,	believers	or	processes)	will	
only	take	into	consideration	how	what	is	being	evaluated	fares	with	respect	to	
this	goal.	Ultimately,	even	the	value	of	knowledge	has	to	be	derived	from	the	
value	of	having	true	and	not	having	false	beliefs.	Admirable	as	this	might	be,	
serious	reasons	have	been	offered	for	resisting	the	monist	view.
First	of	all,	Riggs	argues	that	The	Twin	Goods	View	is	wrong.	His	reasons	
for	 that	claim	have	to	do	with	a	discussion	on	the	value	of	knowledge,	as	
opposed	to	the	value	of	its	components;	for	my	purpose	here,	we	don’t	need	
to	take	up	on	this.1	But	a	valuable	lesson	is	that,	if	we	focus	too	much	on	
the	(value	of)	truth	and	knowledge	and	praise	these	achievements	on	their	
own,	we	lose	sight	of	the	active	role	of	a	cognizer.	Such	reasoning	is	moti-
vated	by	drawing	the	analogies	with	what	we	praise	in	the	domain	of	moral	
behaviour:
“We	value	morally	right	acts	because	we	are	responsible	for	the	good	outcome	that	results.	We	
are	correctly	granted	credit	for	the	good	outcome.”	(Riggs	2002)
This	same	reasoning	applies	to	what	we	value	in	epistemology.	One	can	get	to	
the	truth	by	lucky	coincidence,	or	just	by	chance.	In	this	case,	cognizer	reached	
the	truth	(and	avoided	error),	but	somehow	the	intuition	is,	this	is	not	enough	
to	make	this	achievement	epistemically	valuable.	Thus,	Riggs	concludes,	in	
addition	to	valuing	the	goals	of	getting	to	the	truth	and	avoiding	error,	we
“…	value	the	properties	of	having	reliable	processes,	epistemic	virtues,	truth-directed	motiva-
tions,	and	so	forth.	But,	in	addition,	we	value	being	responsible	for	the	satisfaction	of	our	cogni-
tive	goals.	Such	responsibility	requires	at	least	that	the	goals	are	reached	by	way	of	our	very	own	
epistemically	valuable	properties.”	(Riggs	2002)
First	lesson	from	this	objection	to	monist	epistemology	is	to	acknowledge	the	
importance	and	significance	of	the	responsible	cognizer.
Another	reason	for	abandoning	the	epistemic	monism	(and	the	epistemic	pri-
macy	of	truth)	is	the	fact	that	such	a	view	doesn’t	differentiate	between	good,	
bad,	and	pointless	truths.	In	discussing	the	problem	of	pointless	truth	Jonath-
an	Kvanvig	is	more	concerned	with	showing	that	truth	(and	knowledge	and	
understanding,	whose	value	derives	from	their	connection	to	 truth)	has	un-
qualified	and	universal	value,	but	such	a	view	has	to	explain	for	the	fact	that	
we	find	some	truths	(the	number	of	the	sand	grains	on	the	beach	or	the	number	
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of	grass	blades	in	one’s	backyard)	trivial.2	But	if	our	main	epistemic	goal	is	
believing	truths,	then	even	pointless	truths	seem	to	be	of	importance,	and	we	
should	aim	at	knowing	them.	If	not,	one	has	to	find	a	criterion	for	differentiat-
ing	between	those	that	do	and	those	that	don’t.	One	way	for	doing	so	is	to	in-
voke	the	notion	of	those	truths	which	are	pragmatically	important:	if	having	a	
certain	truth	can	help	us	further	some	practical	goal,	then	being	in	possession	
of	that	truth	is	important,	and	the	truth	in	turn	is	valuable.	Notice,	however,	
plausible	as	this	might	be,	that	it	does	not	solve	our	problem:	the	monist	has	to	
stay	deeply	committed	to	the	view	that	all	truth	matters,	always.	Thus	he	can-
not	accept	any	kind	of	division	between	trivial	and	important	truths.	Yet,	our	
epistemic	practice	strongly	favours	the	view	according	to	which	some	truths	
matter	more	strongly	than	others.	We	are	very	discriminatory	when	it	comes	
to	investing	our	research	efforts	and	we	don’t	want	our	time	and	energy	be	
spent	on	things	which	will	ultimately	have	no	value	or	importance	for	us.
Regardless	of	that,	I	want	to	suggest	another	reason	why	some	truths,	though	
not	practical	in	the	strict	sense,	may	still	be	important.	It	is	at	least	plausible	
to	suggest	that	truths	about	how	to	cure	Alzheimer	have	more	practical	im-
portance	than	truths	about	the	logical	implications	of	double	negation	or	that	
truths	about	how	to	justly	distribute	goods	such	as	housing	and	education	are	
more	important	than	truths	about	Venetian	Renaissance	art.	Yet,	for	some	rea-
son,	we	value	(strongly	and	passionately)	truths	about	double	negation,	and	
truths	about	Venetian	Renaissance	art.	We	would	be	very	happy	if	Alzheimer	
were	cured,	the	hungry	fed,	and	the	homeless	sheltered,	but	nevertheless,	we	
invest	 our	 time	 and	 resources	 into	 studying	 double	 negation	 and	Venetian	
Renaissance	art.3	This	might	be	because	we	are	naturally	curious	and	inquisi-
tive,	but	it	might	also	be	because	we	find	something	valuable	in	these	things.
In	his	2003,	Wayne	Riggs	offered	another	argument	for	abandoning	the	Twin	
Good	View	of	what	matters	 in	epistemology.	According	 to	him,	one	worry	
that	such	a	view	raises	is	that	trying	to	fulfil	the	goal	of	reaching	truth	and	
avoiding	error	might	in	the	end	be	counterproductive.	Given	how	easy	it	is	
to	get	things	wrong	(that	is,	how	hard	it	is	to	know	with	certainty	that	truth,	
rather	than	error	has	been	reached),	cognizer	might	end	up	restraining	from	
epistemic	 pursuit	 and	 suspending	 their	 judgements	 even	 in	 cases	when	 no	
such	suspension	is	necessary.	That	might	seriously	undermine	our	epistemic	
pursuit	as	well	as	lower	the	amount	of	things	we	know.	One	practical	conse-
quence	of	this	is	the	acceptance	of	sceptical	position.	Another	one	is	insisted	
upon	by	Miranda	Fricker	(2007),	though	in	a	slightly	different	context.	Fric-
ker	claims	 that	our	ability	 to	have	knowledge	and	pass	 it	on	 to	others	 is	a	
distinctive	sign	of	our	rationality,	and	in	the	longer	run,	of	our	humanity.	Thus	
the	valuable	monist	insistence	on	truth	might	in	the	end	make	us	destroy	what	
we	mostly	aim	at.	The	more	we	strive	towards	the	truth,	the	further	away	from	
it	we	are.	Elusive	knowledge	would	soon	become	unreachable	knowledge.
1
This	in	itself	 is	a	book-long	debate,	 thus	for	
the	reasons	of	limited	space	we	will	not	enga-
ge	in	it.	Valuable	and	insightful	contributions	
to	 the	 problem	 are	 found	 in	Kvanvig	 2003,	
and	Pritchard,	Millar,	Haddock	2010.
2
See:	Kvanvig	2008.
3
It	might	be	argued	that	these	truths	also	have	
practical	 implication	 given	 that	 they	 make	
those	 who	 study	 them	 happy.	 But	 then	 it	
seems	that	all	truths	are	important	in	that	they	
help	promote	some	other	goods.	I	don’t	think	
this	 is	 a	 problem	 for	 me.	 I	 simply	 want	 to	
show	(though	not	much	rests	on	this)	that,	in	
certain	sense	at	least,	it	is	a	thin	line	between	
the	 number	 of	 blades	 of	 grass,	 the	 number	
of	 houses	 available	 for	 homeless,	 and	 the	
number	 of	Tizian’s	works.	This	 is	 precisely	
what	the	monist	has	to	explain.
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Riggs’	own	solution	to	balancing	these	goals	is	to	recognize	the	epistemic	im-
portance	of	a	goal	that	supersedes	the	two,	and	that	is	pursuit	of	understand-
ing.	We’ll	turn	to	this	shortly.
Abandoning	monist	picture	of	epistemic	aims	and	values	brings	about	a	change	
in	how	we	understand	epistemology.	Riggs	characterizes	such	an	approach	to	
epistemology	as	the	value	turn	in	epistemology,	given	that	the	defining	aspect	
of	it	is	the	recognition	of	other	cognitive	values	beside	truth	and	consequently,	
an	expansion	of	our	epistemic	goals	so	as	to	include	these	values.	Riggs	calls	
this	‘new’	kind	of	epistemology	a	value-driven	epistemology,	and	sees	it	as	
expanding	the	domain	of	epistemological	enquiry	beyond	that	determined	by	
the	traditional	monistic	view	according	to	which	epistemology	was	defined	as	
theory	of	knowledge.	According	to	Riggs,
“…	perhaps	the	greatest	potential	effect	of	value-driven	epistemology	is	its	openness	to	new	
epistemological	 investigations	 that	are	not	 tied	 to	accounts	of	either	knowledge	or	epistemic	
justification.	As	important	as	those	concepts	are	to	epistemology,	they	do	not	exhaust	the	range	
of	epistemic	evaluations	that	are	worthy	of	study.”	(Riggs	2008)
There	are	various	developments	within	epistemology	 itself	 that	brought	on	
such	a	change	in	the	epistemological	enquiry.	Certainly	one	of	the	most	in-
fluential	was	the	increasing	interest	in	the	question	of	the	value	of	knowledge	
as	opposed	to	the	value	of	true	belief,	a	question	that	was,	at	least	according	
to	the	traditional	reading,	developed	in	Plato’s	Meno	but	remained	neglected	
throughout	epistemological	discussions	influenced	by	Descartes.	Of	particu-
lar	importance	to	the	development	of	value-driven	epistemology	are	theories	
developed	by	virtue	epistemologists,	particularly	those	that	answered	to	the	
value	problem	by	invoking	the	epistemic	agency	and	intellectual	virtues	or	
skills	 of	 cognizers.4	Generally	 speaking,	 such	 theories	 see	knowledge	 as	 a	
kind	of	cognitive	achievement	that	springs	from	cognizer’s	ability	and	there-
fore	deserves	credit.
There	 is	a	 lot	 that	 is	valuable	 in	 the	virtue	epistemology	primarily	because	
it	recognizes	the	important	place	that	 individual	cognizer	and	his	cognitive	
apparatus	and	intellectual	character	hold	in	the	human	pursuit	of	knowledge	
(and	other	epistemic	aims).	That	doesn’t	mean	however	 that	 these	 theories	
are	not	entwined	with	their	own	problems	and	inconsistencies,	but	it	 is	not	
my	aim	here	to	discuss	them.	The	lesson	I	want	to	take	from	them	is	the	im-
portance	of	the	active	role	of	the	cognizer,	who	is	asked	to	reflect	not	only	on	
what	he	thinks	he	knows,	but	also	on	his	cognitive	skills	and	belief	forming	
processes,	on	his	epistemic	character,	cognitive	aims	he	finds	worthy	of	pur-
suing,	and	on	how	his	knowledge	and	other	cognitive	benefits	of	his	pursuit	
help	him	 in	 leading	a	good	 life.	Before	we	elaborate	on	 this	connection	 in	
more	details,	let’s	turn	briefly	to	see	how	epistemology	has	modified	itself	in	
order	to	accommodate	these	new	considerations.
2. Epistemology: A wider conception
If	the	focus	of	epistemology	is	no	longer	on	knowledge,	then	what	is	it	on?	
Here	is	how	Kvanvig	sees	it;	the	extent	of	the	quote	only	testifies	to	the	ex-
pansion	of	epistemological	concerns:
“At	the	most	general	level	of	characterization,	epistemology	is	the	study	of	certain	aspects	of	
our	cognitive	endeavours.	In	particular,	it	aims	to	investigate	successful	cognition.	Within	its	
purview,	 then,	 are	 various	 kinds	 of	 cognizing,	 including	 processes	 such	 as	 thinking,	 inquir-
ing,	and	reasoning;	events	such	as	changes	in	one’s	world	view	or	the	adoption	of	a	different	
perspective	on	things;	and	states	such	as	belief	assumptions,	presuppositions,	tenets,	working	
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hypothesis	and	the	like.	Also	within	its	purview	is	the	variety	of	cognitive	successes,	including	
true	beliefs	and	opinions,	viewpoints	that	make	sense	of	the	course	of	experience,	tenets	that	
are	epistemically	adequate,	knowledge,	understanding,	theoretical	wisdom,	rational	presupposi-
tions,	justified	assumptions,	working	hypothesis	likely	to	be	true,	responsible	inquiry	and	the	
like.”	(Kvanvig	2005,	p.	286)
What	we	see	here	is	an	expansion	of	the	domain	epistemology	was	tradition-
ally	occupying.5	The	challenge	for	us	now	is	to	see	why	this	wider	conception	
of	epistemology	fits	better	into	our	cognitive	engagement	with	the	world.	In	
order	to	give	some	kind	of	a	framework	to	how	I	see	this	engagement	takes	
place,	I	will	consider	two	ways	in	which	we	might	reach	knowledge	and	other	
cognitive	gains.	One	such	way,	traditionally	accepted	by	monist	epistemol-
ogy,	is	through	the	words	of	others,	i.e.	testimony.6	Another	way	is	through	
engagement	with	art.	Philosophers	who	claim	that	art	is	a	source	of	cognitive	
gains	often	claim	that	it	is	not	necessarily	knowledge	but	understanding	that	
art	gives	us.	Given	that	artistic	creation	is	not	guided	by	desire	to	reach	truth,	
monist	epistemology	cannot	see	art	as	a	valuable	source	of	knowledge,	and	
given	 that	 it	 doesn’t	 recognize	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding,	 it	 cannot	
explain	(or,	more	importantly	validate)	the	rather	intuitive	view	(traditionally	
defended	by	aesthetic	cognitivists	since	Aristotle)	that	there	are	many	things	
we	learn	from	art.7
Let	us	start	with	the	first	aspect	from	Kvanvig’s	list:	epistemological	research	
includes	 various	 kinds	 of	 cognizing,	 including	 processes	 such	 as	 thinking,	
inquiring,	and	 reasoning.	Obviously,	 thinking,	 inquiring,	and	 reasoning	are	
all	involved	in	the	very	process	of	responding	to	someone’s	testimony.	If	one	
is	to	make	sense	of	a	content	that	the	informer	is	delivering,	one	has	to	pay	
attention	to	what	is	being	said,	meaning	one	has	to	try	to	construct	a	story	of	
what	happened	and	what	kinds	of	information	are	being	transmitted.	Ideally,	
the	 listener	also	makes	an	attempt	 to	 incorporate	new	pieces	of	knowledge	
into	his	existing	web	of	knowledge.	Similarly,	thinking,	inquiring,	and	rea-
soning	are	involved	in	reading	a	literary	work.	The	process	of	understanding	a	
work	involves	filing	in	the	gaps	not	explicitly	given	and	asking	about	fictional	
truth:	these	processes	of	negotiating	between	fictional	world	and	real	world	
would	 be	 impossible	 unless	 the	 reader	 engages	 in	 thinking	 about	what	 he	
is	reading,	inquiring	into	the	connections	between	characters	and	reasoning	
about	how	the	episodes	within	the	novel	are	structurally	connected	and	de-
pend	upon	each	other.	But	more	importantly	for	how	we	learn	from	literature	
is	to	see	that	reading	a	literary	work	invites	thinking,	inquiring	and	reasoning	
about	the	real	world.	At	least	one	aspect	of	the	reading	process	is	trying	to	
determine	how	what	is	described	fares	with	respect	to	how	things	are	in	the	
4
See	for	example:	Fairweather,	Zagzebski	(eds.),	
2001.
5
It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	this	is	not	the	only	
way	 in	which	 contemporary	 epistemologists	
think	of	epistemology.	Another	new	approach	
to	epistemology	 is	 the	one	pursued	by	Rob-
erts	and	Woods	who	have	recently	developed	
an	account	of	what	they	call	regulative epis­
temology	 (see	 their	 2007).	 See	 also:	 Prijić-
Samaržija,	Bojanić	2012.
6
Due	to	the	lack	of	space,	I	cannot	go	into	de-
tails	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 testimony	 and	
conditions	 that	 have	 to	 be	 fulfilled	 for	 it	 to	
successfully	 transmit	 knowledge.	 Suffice	 to	
say	that	testimony	has	to	do	with	people	tell-
ing	us	things	they	know,	or	think	they	know,	
or	are	reliable	about,	without	knowingly	and	
intentionally	deceiving	us.	In	that	sense,	I	ad-
vocate	what	is	known	as	“The	Broad	View	of	
Testimony”	(see:	Fricker	2007).
7
See:	Vidmar	2013	for	the	connection	between	
art	 and	 cognitive	 gains	 pertaining	 to	 plural-
ism.
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world.	This	 is	 captured	by	way	of	 creating	new	patterns	of	 thinking	about	
the	real	world	situations,	which	are	inspired	by	the	specificities	of	the	work	
and	by	what	is	made	salient	in	the	work.	Thus	in	many	ways,	the	cognitive	
processes	we	engage	in	when	we	listen	to	the	testimony	and	in	the	process	of	
reading,	can	be	evaluated	positively	by	epistemic	processes	Kvanvig	sees	as	
pertaining	to	epistemological	research.
The	next	important	aspect	of	epistemology	is	evaluation	of	“events	such	as	
changes	 in	 one’s	world	 view	or	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 different	 perspective	 on	
things”.	Both,	testimony	and	literary	works	can	contribute	to	these	kinds	of	
cognitive	processes,	particularly	 if	we	 see	 them	as	 sources	of	 experiences.	
My	friend’s	testimony	on	her	adulterous	relationship	can	help	me	understand	
why	people	engage	in	such	behaviour	in	the	same	(or	at	 least	similar)	way	
as	reading	about	Ema	Bovary	or	Ana	Karenina.	Valerie	Tiberius	(2005)	has	
argued	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 change	 in	 perspective	 can	 result	 in	 acquisition	 of	
wisdom.	If	my	friend	tells	me	about	her	experience	of	living	with	cancer,	yet	
remains	positive	and	optimistic	about	the	possibility	of	still	having	a	valuable,	
fulfilled	life,	then	what	she	is	telling	me	can	influence	how	I	see	the	world	
and	the	prospects	of	fulfilled	life	and	can	bring	about	a	change	in	my	perspec-
tive	on	how	to	deal	with	hardships	of	life.	Many	philosophers	emphasize	the	
ability	of	literature	to	cause	a	change	in	perspective,	most	often	in	terms	of	
how	one	sees	the	world	morally.8	As	a	result	of	reading,	readers	can	develop	
new	evaluative	and	descriptive	patterns	through	which	they	think	about	their	
experience,	 they	can	 realize	 that	 their	previously	held	view	was	 lacking	 in	
depth	or	was	too	superficial,	not	sensitive	towards	complexities	that	make	our	
experience.
Next,	epistemology	concerns	itself	with	“states	such	as	belief	assumptions,	
presuppositions,	tenets,	working	hypothesis”.	At	this	point	of	course	it	is	not	
yet	clear	how	such	states	lead	to	any	recognizably	valuable	cognitive	goods,	
but	at	least	it	is	recognized	that	they	do	have	a	role	to	play	in	our	attempt	to	
reach	cognitive	grasp	of	our	world.	Knowing	that	p	is	always	better	than	as-
suming	(even	if	correctly)	that	p.	However,	it	is	wrong	to	claim	that	hypoth-
esis	and	assumption	have	no	epistemic	value.	They	are	of	great	importance	
for	the	scientific	research.	Why	then	shouldn’t	we	claim	they	can	also	be	used	
by	individuals,	in	their	daily	attempts	to	reach	knowledge	and	gain	a	wider	
cognitive	grasp	on	various	aspects	of	reality?	Belief	assumptions,	presuppo-
sitions,	tenets	and	working	hypothesis	are	not	important	only	from	the	per-
spective	of	how	a	cognizer	organizes	her	own	research,	but	also	for	how	the	
transmission	of	knowledge	and	other	epistemic	benefits	take	place	in	a	soci-
ety.	One	devastating	way	in	which	assumptions	and	presuppositions	affect	the	
cognitive	transfer	of	knowledge	in	the	case	of	testimony	was	demonstrated	by	
Miranda	Fricker	(2007)	in	her	analyses	of	the	ways	in	which	prejudice	against	
women	lower	their	status	as	reliable	informers.
Finally,	Kvanving	inserts	variety	of	cognitive	successes	on	his	list,	including	
true	beliefs	 and	opinions,	viewpoints	 that	make	 sense	of	 the	 course	of	 ex-
perience,	 tenets	 that	are	epistemically	adequate,	knowledge,	understanding,	
theoretical	wisdom,	rational	presuppositions,	justified	assumptions,	working	
hypothesis	likely	to	be	true,	responsible	inquiry	and	the	like.	Putting	knowl-
edge	aside,	given	its	traditional	importance	for	epistemology,	let	us	focus	on	
these	other	cognitive	successes.	If	all	of	these	count	as	cognitive	successes,	
then	all	of	these	are	states	we	should	strive	towards.	This	is	precisely	what	
pluralist	epistemology	claims.	In	addition	to	knowledge,	two	more	cognitive	
successes	are	said	to	be	important:	understanding	and	wisdom.	Let’s	turn	to	
these	now.9
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3. Knowledge, wisdom and understanding: Friends or foes?
We	saw	that	the	abandonment	of	monistic	picture	of	epistemology	means	rec-
ognizing	that	there	are	more	epistemic	goals	we	should	be	striving	towards.	
According	to	Kvanvig,	this	plurality	of	epistemic	goals	includes	“knowledge,	
understanding,	 rationality,	 justification,	 sense-making”	 (Kvanvig	 2005,	 p.	
287).	More	or	less,	this	list	exhausts	the	key	notions	of	contemporary	epis-
temological	debates,	with	the	addition	of	wisdom.	Once	the	epistemologists	
turned	their	attention	toward	understanding,	it	did	not	take	it	long	for	it	to	win	
the	epistemic	throne	and	replace	knowledge	as	 the	chief	cognitive	success.	
Duncan	Pritchard,	Jonathan	Kvanvig,	Wayne	Riggs,	Catherine	Elgin,	Linda	
Zagzebski,	and	George	Gardiner	all	provide	arguments	that	show	that	under-
standing	is	more	valuable	than	knowledge.10	The	most	recent	developments	
in	 epistemology	 suggest	 that	 the	 next	 epistemic	 battle	 between	values	 and	
goals	will	be	the	one	between	understanding	and	wisdom.	Several	philoso-
phers	now	seem	to	be	giving	precedence	to	wisdom	and	provide	accounts	of	
it	that	are	based	on	the	fact	that	reaching	wisdom,	that	is,	becoming	wise,	is	
what	all	epistemic	agents	should	strive	towards.	In	discussing	the	value	turn	
and	the	changes	it	brought	about,	Jason	Baehr	claims	that	“whatever	its	other	
qualities	may	be,	wisdom	 is	widely	 regarded	as	 a	major	–	perhaps	 the	 su-
preme	–	epistemic	good”	(Baehr	2010,	p.	82).	In	order	to	decide	whether	this	
battle	is	necessary,	that	is,	which	epistemic	good	should	be	seen	as	supreme,	
let	us	see	in	more	details	the	nature	of	each	of	them.	I	will	not	have	much	to	
say	about	knowledge,	given	that	monism	has	been	giving	it	its	due	attention.	
Here	I	want	to	elaborate	a	bit	on	understanding	and	wisdom.
3.1. Understanding
Despite	the	constantly	growing	interest	in	the	notion	of	understanding,	there	
are	still	many	grey	areas	left	to	explore.	Is	understanding	to	be	understood	as	
a	process,	whereby	the	cognizer	comes	to	understand	something,	or	is	it	to	be	
understood	as	a	state,	quite	like	knowledge,	where	a	cognizer	can	say	‘I	un-
derstand	that’	or	‘I	understand	how’.	A	question	that	precedes	such	considera-
tions	is	what	it	is	that	can	be	understood	in	the	first	place,	i.e.	what	is	the	ob-
ject	of	understanding.	This	is	particularly	problematic	for	two	reasons.	First,	
if	analogies	between	‘knowing	that’	and	‘understanding	that’	are	brought	too	
close,	then	one	has	to	explain	what	is	it	that	is	ultimately	distinctive	of	under-
standing	that	makes	it	different	from	and	superior	to	knowledge.	Couldn’t	we	
just	claim	that	understanding	is	a	kind	of	knowledge,	perhaps	in	the	sense	that	
the	one	who	understands	simply	knows	more,	namely	knows	the	reasons	why	
something	 (rather	 than	 some	 other	 thing)	 happened?11	This	 is	 the	 heritage	
8
Matthew	Kieran	has	insisted	on	this,	see:	Kie-
ran	1996.
9
Short	 terminological	 clarification:	 to	 claim	
that	something	is	epistemic	or	cognitive	(here	
the	two	are	synonymous	in	the	sense	that	epis-
temology,	in	part,	has	to	do	with	our	cognitive	
economy)	success	implies	that	it	is	also	a	goal	
we	should	aim	to	reach.
10
See:	 Pritchard	 2010	 (in	 Pritchard,	 Millar,	
Haddock	2010);	Kvanvig	2003,	2005,	2008;	
Riggs	 2003,	 2008;	 Elgin	 1996;	 Zagzebski	
2001;	Gardiner	2012.
11
Kvanvig	 calls	 this	 (and	 argues	 against)	 the	
common	assumption	about	the	nature	of	un-
derstanding:	 “Though	 the	 nature	 of	 under-
standing	 is	 not	 often	 addressed,	 it	 is	 none-
theless	 commonly	 assumed	 that	 knowledge	
and	understanding	bear	a	direct	and	intimate	
connection,	for	the	assumption	is	that	under-
standing	of	the	theoretical	sort	is	a	species	of	
knowledge.	The	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 kind	
of	understanding	at	issue	when	regarding	our	
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left	to	epistemologists	by	the	philosophers	of	science,	who	saw	understand-
ing	as	a	special	kind	of	knowledge,	namely	knowledge	of	the	causes.	Within	
philosophy	of	science,	understanding	was	seen	as	the	result	of	the	successful	
process	of	explaining:	if	we	want	to	know	why	certain	state	of	affairs,	A,	took	
place,	we	need	an	explanation	of	why	A,	rather	than	B	or	C,	and	the	crucial	
part	 of	 such	 explanation	was	knowing	 the	 reasons	 (causes)	which	made	A	
(rather	B	or	C)	develop.
Second	worry	is	that	one	might	end	up	explaining	what	understanding	is	by	
providing	 an	 example	of	 it:	 understanding	 is	what	 it	 is	 involved	 in	 under-
standing	a	 sentence,	or	 a	mathematic	proof.	Though	 this	 is	 a	good	pointer	
towards	how	to	 think	of	understanding,	 it	 is	 radically	 too	narrow	and	does	
not	allow	for	a	full	impact	that	understanding	as	cognitive	success	bears.	One	
of	 the	 reasons	why	 some	 philosophers	 are	 so	 sceptical	 over	 the	 epistemic	
significance	of	understanding	is	their	inability	to	recognize	various	ways	in	
which	understanding	is	important	for	our	cognitive	economy.	Swirski	(2007)	
claimed	that	one	problem	with	it	is	that	it	is	unclear	whether	it	is	a	process	or	
a	state.	But	the	fact	that	understanding	can	be	a	gradual	process	as	well	as	a	
state	should	not	be	interpreted	as	a	negative	aspect	of	understanding.	There	is	
a	valuable	insight	contained	in	“we	are	coming	to	understand	better	and	better	
the	impacts	that	social	networks	such	as	Facebook	have	on	social	connections	
children	make	with	their	peers”.	The	reason	why	such	an	understanding	is	a	
process	is	the	fact	that	new	aspects	of	these	impacts	are	revealed	with	time,	
aspects	which	 couldn’t	 have	 been	 taken	 into	 consideration	 before.	On	 the	
other	hand,	“A	child	understands	Pythagorean	Theorem”	implies	a	state	she	
reached.	 It	 can	 be	manifested	 in	 her	 ability	 to	 solve	 various	mathematical	
tasks	in	which	Pythagorean	Theorem	is	used.	But	notice	that	as	she	starts	to	
engage	with	more	and	more	complex	calculations,	her	understanding	of	Py-
thagorean	Theorem	develops	and	can	again	be	seen	as	a	process.	In	order	for	
the	child	to	be	able	to	successfully	perform	these	calculations	it	is	not	enough	
to	know	the	correct	formula.	She	needs	to	understand	the	way	it	functions	and	
the	implications	it	has.
These	 kinds	 of	 considerations	 lead	 Richard	Mason,	 whose	Understanding 
Understanding	(2003)	is	one	of	the	most	insightful,	elaborated,	and	system-
atic	contribution	to	this	problem,	to	claim	that	critical	theory	of	understanding	
cannot	be	based	on	the	critical	theory	of	knowledge.	Analysing	various	ways	
in	which	we	might	think	of	the	relation	between	knowledge	and	understand-
ing	and	the	priority	of	one	over	the	other,	he	claims	that	“there	is	no	reason	
to	suppose	that	understanding	needs	‘conditions’	of	a	kind	that	would	mirror	
those	in	a	theory	of	knowledge”	(Mason	2003,	p.	48).
A	valuable	analysis	of	understanding	is	found	in	Riggs,	Zagzebski,	Pritchard,	
and	Kvanvig,	all	of	whom	explain	understanding	in	terms	of	grasping	certain	
aspects	of	the	object	of	understanding.	According	to	Riggs,
“What	 is	 involved	 in	having	understanding	may	well	be	even	more	obscure	 than	what	 is	 in-
volved	 in	having	knowledge.	But	 it	 seems	clear	 enough	 that	 it	 includes	having	a	 true	grasp	
of	some	significant	part	of	 reality	without	being	deeply	deceived	about	 it.	Thus	achieving	 it	
requires	achieving	our	two	traditional	goals	…	Understanding	some	part	of	the	world	requires	
an	appreciation	for	order,	fit,	and	pattern.	It	requires	that	one	‘see’	how	things	fit	together	and	
why	they	are	the	way	they	are.”	(Riggs	2003,	p.	350)12
Linda	Zagzebski	 (2001)	 retains	 this	 basic	 idea.	According	 to	Zagzebski,	 it	
was	already	in	Plato	that	understanding	was	given	epistemic	precedence	over	
knowledge,	but	somehow	epistemologists	lost	this	from	sight	because	of	their	
constant	unyielding	focus	on	justification.	But	understanding	can	better	fur-
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ther	our	epistemic	goals	of	obtaining	 ‘cognitive	contact’	with	 structures	of	
reality.	According	 to	her,	 there	are	 three	elements	 that	 figure	 in	 the	under-
standing.	First,
“…	understanding	is	a	state	gained	by	learning	an	art	or	skill,	a	techne. One	gains	understanding	
by	knowing how	to	do	something	well,	and	this	makes	one	a	reliable	person	to	consult	in	matters	
pertaining	to	the	skill	in	question.”	(Zagzebski	2001,	p.	241)
Person	who	understands	(why	the	car	isn’t	working	in	circumstances	C1)	is	
able	to	solve	the	problem	not	only	in	C1,	but	in	all	the	relevant	circumstances	
in	which	the	car	might	break	down.	On	the	other	hand,	a	person	who	knows	
how	to	fix	the	car	in	C1	but	lacks	understanding	of	why	the	car	broke	down	in	
the	first	place,	will	not	be	able	to	repair	it	in	any	other	circumstances.
Second	feature	Zagzebski	identifies	as	relevant	to	understanding	is	that
“…	understanding	is	not	directed	toward	a	discrete	object,	but	involves	seeing	the	relation	of	
parts	to	other	parts	and	perhaps	even	the	relation	of	part	to	a	whole.	It	follows	that	the	object	of	
understanding	is	not	a	discrete	proposition”	(Ibid.,	p.	241).
We	have	seen	this	idea	already	in	Riggs,	and	as	it	stands	it	is	one	of	the	most	
emphasized	aspects	of	understanding.
Third	feature	that	figures	in	Zagzebski’s	account	of	understanding	is	that	it
“…	represents	some	portion	of	the	world	nonpropositionally.”	(Ibid.,	p.	242)
Zagzebski	sees	the	world	as	composed	of	various	structures	and	finds	it
“…	unlikely	that	propositional	structure	exhausts	the	structure	of	reality.”	(Ibid.,	p.	242)
Therefore,	the	manner	in	which	we	come	to	grasp	these	structures	is	through	
understanding:
“I	propose	that	understanding is the state of comprehension of nonpropositional structures of 
reality.”	(Ibid.,	p.	242)
The	most	influential	account	of	understanding	is	provided	by	Jonathan	Kvan-
vig.	His	 interest	 is	 in	 two	 senses	 of	 understanding:	when	understanding	 is	
claimed	for	some	object,	that	is,	subject	matter,	and	when	it	involves	under-
standing	that	something	is	the	case,	which	covers	understanding	why,	when,	
where	 and	 what.	 On	 a	 first	 approximation,	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	
are	both	factive.	One	important	difference	however	is	that	in	some	contexts,	
knowing	(Bill	Clinton)	does	not	 imply	understanding	(him).	Note	however	
that	 from	 understanding	 (a	 body	 of	 information)	 follows	 that	 one	 has	 the	
knowledge	(of	the	information).	This	suggests	that	understanding	is	not	iden-
tical	with	knowledge,	which	implies	that	understanding	adds	something	that	
knowledge	itself	lacks.	Here	is	how	Kvanvig	accounts	for	it:
cognitive	success	and	achievements	 is	 some	
type	of	deep	and	comprehensive	knowledge	
concerning	 a	 particular	 subject,	 topic,	 or	 is-
sue.”	(Kvanvig	2003,	p.	188)
12
Riggs	 believes	 that	 accounting	 for	 under-
standing	in	this	way	allows	us	to	surpass	the	
practical	and	theoretical	limitations	that	tradi-
tional	epistemic	goals	of	believing	truth	and	
avoiding	 error	 impose	 on	 us.	 Namely,	 from	
the	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view,	 our	 epistemic	
desire	 to	 acquire	 as	 much	 truth	 as	 possible	
might	 be	 restrained	 by	 our	 fear	 of	 getting	
things	wrong.	But	 if	we	 aim	 at	 understand-
ing,	and	understanding	can	be	reached	even	if	
there	are	some	erroneous	components	 in	 the	
wider	 system,	 then	one	can	 still	gain	cogni-
tive	 benefits	 that	 might	 be	 unreachable	 if	
we	were	careful	not	 to	make	a	mistake.	The	
claim	that	understanding	can	be	attained	even	
if	there	are	some	errors	in	the	wider	cognitive	
construction	is	not	unique	to	Riggs,	as	we’ll	
see.
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“The	central	feature	of	understanding,	it	seems	to	me,	is	in	the	neighbourhood	of	what	internalist	
coherence	theories	say	about	justification.	Understanding	requires	the	grasping	of	explanatory	
and	other	coherence-making	relationships	in	a	large	and	comprehensive	body	of	information.	
One	can	know	many	unrelated	pieces	of	information	but	understanding	is	achieved	only	when	
informational	items	are	pieced	together	by	the	subject	in	question	(…)	Whereas	knowledge	can	
have	as	its	object	individual	propositions,	understanding	may	not.”	(Kvanvig	2003,	p.	192)
Thus,	what	is	of	crucial	importance	are	various	elements	within	one’s	cogni-
tive	grasp	and	the	way	they	are	related	to	each	other.	This	relation	may	be	
explanatory,	logical,	probabilistic	or	of	some	other	kind	that	brings	about	a	
coherence	and	unity	among	them.	What	is	crucial	for	understanding	is	 that	
the	cognizer	sees	how	these	relations	among	elements	are	held	together	and	
how	they	interact	to	one	another,	producing	a	state	of	affair	that	is	the	object	
of	understanding.	Kvanvig	calls	this	‘theoretical	understanding’	and	what	is	
important	is	that	it	is	not	directed	at	particular	propositions,	but	at	the	whole	
they	create.
One	of	the	crucial	differences	between	knowledge	and	understanding	is	the	
fact	that	understanding,	unlike	knowledge,	comes	in	degrees.	This	makes	un-
derstanding	different	from	knowledge,	and	it	also	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	
talk	in	terms	of	understanding	something	better	or	with	a	greater	degree.	This	
is	one	of	the	reasons	why	Kvanvig	eventually	rejects	the	view	according	to	
which	understanding	is	a	species	of	knowledge.	The	fundamental	difference	
between	the	two	is	revealed	in	the	fact	that	knowledge	is	primarily	directed	at	
the	world	and	the	relevant	connection	is	that	between	the	mind	and	the	world.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 understanding	 is	 directed	 at	 the	 connections	 of	 beliefs	
within	the	mind.	The	final	requirement	that	Kvanvig	puts	forward	for	under-
standing	is	that	the	grasping	of	these	relations	be	psychological:
“The	way	in	which	all	the	information	fits	together	must	be	part	of	what	the	person	is	aware	of.”	
(Kvanvig	2003,	p.	202)
The	idea	here	is	that	one	cannot	understand	something	without	being	aware	
of	it.	Someone	might	object	to	this	by	claiming	that	if	understanding	is	only	
a	matter	of	 internal	 connection,	 then	 it	 can	completely	 fail	 to	grasp	 things	
in	 the	external	world.	It	can	be	false,	 in	other	words,	or	 it	can	miss	out	on	
how	things	are	in	the	world.	Yet	this	would	be	wrong.	According	to	Kvanvig,	
both	knowledge	and	understanding	are	factive	and	in	that	sense	truth	(of	what	
is	understood)	matters	to	understanding,	but	the	difference	between	the	way	
truth	 is	connected	 to	knowledge	and	understanding	 is	 in	 the	 role	 that	 truth	
plays	in	Gettier-like	cases.	While	instances	of	gettierized	true	belief	are	not	
considered	knowledge,	Kvanvig	suggests	that	understanding	is	not	vulnerable	
to	Gettier-like	cases.	Given	the	cognitive	effort	on	the	part	of	the	cognizer	to	
reach	understanding,	one	cannot	come	to	it	by	luck	or	by	accident.13
Roberts	and	Wood	point	toward	another	way	in	which	understanding	can	be	
evaluated	with	respect	to	truth:
“Something	like	truth	is	typically	a	condition	for	understanding.”	(Roberts,	Wood	2007,	p.	43)
This	can	be	further	explained	in	terms	of	adequacy:
“Understanding	anything	typically	has	to	be	more	or	less	adequate	to	what	it	is	about.”	(Ibid.,	
p.	43–4)
There	is	one	further	aspect	of	Roberts	and	Wood’s	 theory	that	 is	appealing	
and	that	is	the	way	they	connect	understanding	to	the	active	engagement	of	
the	cognizer:
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“Understanding	often	emerges	only	with	concerted	intellectual	activities	like	exploring,	testing,	
dialectical	interchange,	probing,	comparing,	writing,	and	reflecting.”	(Ibid.,	p.	50)
Notice	that	none	of	these	intellectual	activities	is	necessary	for	gaining	simple	
truths	(and	thus	knowing)	that	there	is	a	glass	in	front	of	me.	So	at	least	in	
some	 sense,	 knowing	 involves	 less	 activities	 and	mental	work	 than	under-
standing.14
The	most	developed	account	of	understanding	is	the	one	by	Catherine	Elgin,	
in	her	book	Considered Judgment.	The	book	itself	is	deeply	concerned	with	
how	we	get	from	individual	propositions	and	beliefs	to	more	coherent	and	en-
compassing,	full	developed	theories.	In	developing	such	a	view,	Elgin	relies	
on	the	Rawlsian	model	of	deliberations	in	domain	of	politics	and	her	central	
notion	is	that	of	reflective	equilibrium	and	coherentist	account	of	how	we	get	
to	know	something	and	justify	it.	Such	a	coherent	system	includes	not	only	
beliefs	of	which	it	is	composed	but	also	values,	rules,	categories	and	methods	
of	justification,	all	of	which	are	subject	to	constant	revision	and	reconfigura-
tion	as	the	new	beliefs,	new	values,	new	aims,	etc.	come	along.	This	is	radi-
cally	oversimplified	retelling	of	Elgin’s	account,	but	it	gives	us	enough	to	go	
by.	Here	I	am	interested	in	her	account	of	understanding,	and	the	role	it	plays	
in	our	cognitive	economy.
Elgin	begins	her	account	of	understanding	by	noting	that:
“Cognitive	progress	 is	 no	piecemeal	 accretion	of	 separately	 established	 facts	 but	 a	 dynamic	
interplay	of	novel	proposals	and	entrenched	commitments.	 Integration	of	new	material	often	
requires	 reconfiguration	 of	 commitments	 already	 in	 place,	 revision	 or	 repudiation	 of	 earlier	
adoptions.”	(Elgin	1996,	p.	122)
What	 is	crucial	 is	 that	 she	does	not	 take	 the	 result	of	 such	a	process	 to	be	
knowledge	but	understanding.	In	accounting	for	such	a	view,	her	account	of	
understanding	 and	 the	 crucial	ways	 in	which	 it	 differs	 from	 knowledge	 is	
revealed:	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 do	 not	 share	 the	 same	 conditions.	
Knowledge	is	“a	permanent	achievement,	its	justification	unconditional	and	
[it	 is]	 insensitive	 to	 the	 changes	 in	 epistemic	 clime”	 (Ibid.).	However,	 un-
derstanding,	as	an	epistemic	achievement	that	is	accomplished	only	within	a	
wider	structure	of	reflective	equilibrium,	is	a	result	of	various	elements	falling	
into	place	(elements	such	as	values,	rules,	categories,	methods)	which	guide	
the	research	and	these	cannot	be	evaluated	with	respect	to	some	permanent	
truth.	This	allows	for	the	possibility	that	a	falsehood	is	inserted	into	the	sys-
13
Of	course,	intuitions	vary	here.	Someone	akin	
to	 anti-luck	 epistemology	 might	 claim	 that	
the	source	of	 information	has	 to	be	 immune	
to	all	kinds	of	Gettier	like	scenarios,	even	if	
S	still	managed	to	(or	was	lucky	enough	to)	
‘choose’	 right,	 in	which	 case	 he	would	 side	
against	 Kvanving	 on	 this.	 Had	 it	 been	 too	
easy	for	S	to	go	wrong,	then,	even	if	he	in	fact	
hadn’t,	 this	 still	 isn’t	 good	 enough	 to	 grant	
him	understanding.	My	 intuition	 is	more	on	
the	Kvanvig	side.
14
This	 is	particularly	 so	 for	 those	who	defend	
externalist	accounts	of	knowledge	and	 justi-
fication,	 according	 to	which	 all	 that	 is	 nec-
essary	 for	 knowledge	 is	 reliable	 belief-for-
mation	 process.	 In	 fact,	Goldman,	 the	main	
defender	of	such	a	view,	rejects	the	need	for	
a	cognizer	to	wonder	about	the	reliability	or	
justifiability	 of	 such	 process,	 which	 means	
that	on	this	reading,	reflective	or	intellectual	
activities	of	the	kind	that	Roberts	and	Wood	
describe	are	not	necessary.	Though	 I	do	not	
think	 reliabilism	 is	 enough	 for	 justification	
(in	the	sense	that	justification	has	to	include	
internalist	 component),	 it	 has	 to	 be	 admit-
ted	 that	 in	 many	 instances	 when	 cognizers	
believe	 they	know,	 they	do	not	 subject	 their	
beliefs	to	any	kind	of	internalist	test,	yet	there	
is	a	sense	that	they	have	knowledge	(for	ex-
ample,	upon	entering	a	room	with	one	table,	
a	 cognizer	 automatically	 forms	 the	 justified	
belief	‘there	is	one	table	in	this	room’	and	we	
are	ready	to	ascribe	her	that	knowledge,	even	
if	she	never	considered	the	sceptical	scenario	
as	a	real	treat	to	her	statement.
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
63	(1/2017)	pp.	(215–234)
I.	Vidmar,	Epistemic	Game	of	Thrones226
tem,	which	cannot	be	the	case	with	knowledge.	However,	Elgin	urges,	false-
hoods	can	have	a	valuable	role	in	advancing	understanding.	Her	example	is	
the	law	of	gravity,	which
“…	is	not	strictly	true	since	it	neglects	the	gravitational	attraction	of	everything	except	the	Earth.	
Still,	it	provides	genuine	insight	into	the	behaviour	of	falling	bodies,	contributes	to	a	general	
theory	of	terrestrial	motion,	connects	observations	and	measurements	with	physical	laws,	and	
closely	 approximates	 the	vastly	more	 complicated	 truth.	 It	 is	 plainly	 epistemically	valuable,	
even	if	its	falsity	disqualifies	it	as	knowledge.”	(Elgin	1996,	p.	123)
It	is	important	here	to	emphasize	that	on	this	account,	understanding	is	not	
restricted	to	facts	and	it	does	not	have	to	be	“couched	in	sentences”	but	“lo-
cated	in	apt	terminology,	insightful	questions,	effective	nonverbal	symbols,	
intelligent	behaviour”	(Ibid.).	Nevertheless,	it	represents	a	valuable	cognitive	
achievement,	one	which	is	“more	comprehensive	than	knowledge	ever	hoped	
to	 be”	 (Ibid.),	 given	 that	 it	 extends	 to	 domains	 and	 objects	 that	 cannot	 be	
captured	by	knowledge.	These	include	understanding	rules,	reasons,	actions,	
passions,	objectives,	obstacles,	 techniques,	 tools,	forms,	functions,	fictions,	
facts,	 pictures,	worlds,	 equations,	 patterns.	What	 is	 important	 is	 that	 these	
are	“not	isolated	accomplishments;	they	coalesce	into	an	understanding	of	a	
subject,	discipline,	or	field	of	study”	(Ibid.).	Finally,	Elgin,	as	well	as	Kvan-
vig,	Zagzebski	and	Roberts	and	Wodd,	sees	understanding	as	something	that	
comes	in	degrees.
Rather	than	wondering	about	the	differences	between	these	accounts	of	un-
derstanding,	 let	us	briefly	consider	what	 the	lack	of	understanding	consists	
in.	At	the	first	approximation,	lack	of	understanding	over	a	subject	matter	is	
evident	when	a	person	lacks	appropriate	recourses	in	her	cognitive	economy	
to	 see	 the	 subject	matter	 as	 a	well-supported,	 coherent	 system	 that	 leaves	
no	room	for	uncertainties	and	unresolved	issues.	A	person	who	understands	
something	will	not	be	in	need	of	any	additional	information	or	judgment	to	be	
able	to	see	the	connections,	and	to	grasp	the	situation	in	all	of	its	complexi-
ties.	She	will	also	have	no	need	to	rely	on	others	to	solve	her	problems.	In	that	
sense,	understanding	something	 implies	 the	position	of	epistemic	authority	
over	a	situation,	rather	than	the	position	of	epistemic	dependence.	A	lack	of	
understanding	may	also	be	visible	when	one’s	perspective	on	the	subject	mat-
ter	is	incomplete,	and	the	cognizer’s	beliefs	are	indifferent	and	disconnected.	
This	might	be	manifested	in	one’s	inability	to	come	up	with	an	account	he	
himself	is	ready	to	offer	to	others	or	to	accept	himself.	Restraining	from	judg-
ment	when	judgement	is	demanded	might	be	a	sign	of	considerable	holes	in	
one’s	grasp	of	situation	or	circumstances.
3.2. Wisdom
We	saw	that	an	epistemic	theory	of	understanding	is	still	a	work	in	progress,	
and	 things	 are	 similar	when	 it	 comes	 to	 a	 theory	of	wisdom.	Some	of	 the	
questions	regarding	wisdom	are	the	same	as	regarding	understanding:	what	
exactly	is	the	connection	between	knowledge	and	wisdom,	and	are	there	con-
ditions	of	wisdom,	such	that,	if	one	satisfies	them	then	one	is	wise.	However,	
it	seems	that	most	of	the	attempts	to	come	to	a	theory	of	wisdom	struggle	to	
incorporate	several	factors.	First	of	all,	the	heritage	of	Socrates,	and	his	idea	
that	wisdom	has	to	do	with	knowing	that	one	doesn’t	know	anything.	Second,	
and	more	influentially,	Aristotle’s	distinction	between	sophia	and	phronesis,	
which	is	mostly	visible	in	the	fact	that	most	often,	wisdom	is	said	to	have	two	
kinds,	theoretical	and	practical.	Thirdly,	the	fact	that	wisdom	can	be	practical	
suggests	that	being	wise	has	to	do	with	how	one	lives,	not	only	with	what	is	
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going	on	in	his	cognitive	economy.	In	that	sense,	wisdom	is	brought	in	con-
nection	with	‘knowing	how’,	not	only	‘knowing	that’.	And	finally,	a	 lot	of	
things	said	about	wisdom	seem	to	rely	on	and	set	out	to	incorporate	what	has	
become	one	of	the	most	famous	(even	if	not	particularly	unified)	notion	of	
wisdom	expressed	by	Nozick:
“Wisdom	is	not	just	one	type	of	knowledge,	but	diverse.	What	a	wise	person	needs	to	know	and	
understand	constitutes	a	varied	list:	the	most	important	goals	and	values	of	life	–	the	ultimate	
goal,	if	there	is	one;	what	means	will	reach	these	goals	without	too	great	a	coast;	what	kinds	of	
dangers	threaten	the	achieving	of	these	goals;	how	to	recognize	and	avoid	or	minimize	these	
dangers;	what	different	types	of	beings	are	like	in	their	actions	and	motives	(as	this	presents	
dangers	or	opportunities);	what	is	not	possible	or	feasible	to	achieve	(or	avoid);	how	to	tell	what	
is	appropriate	when;	knowing	when	certain	goals	are	sufficiently	achieved;	what	limitations	are	
unavoidable	and	how	to	accept	them;	how	to	improve	oneself	and	one’s	relationships	with	others	
or	society;	knowing	what	true	and	apparent	value	of	various	things	is;	when	to	take	a	long-term	
view;	knowing	the	variety	and	obduracy	of	facts,	institutions,	and	human	nature;	understanding	
what	one’s	real	motives	are;	how	to	cope	and	deal	with	major	tragedies	and	dilemmas	of	life,	
and	with	the	major	good	things	too.”	(taken	from	Miščević	2012,	p.	130)
Let	us	briefly	go	through	some	of	these	theories.15
The	first	one	is	inspired	by	Socrates’	insistence	on	taking	an	attitude	of	humil-
ity	towards	one’s	own	knowledge.	This	view	is	known	as	epistemic humility 
view	and	according	to	it,	wisdom	consists	in	acknowledging	one’s	ignorance.	
Someone	who	accepts	some	account	of	humility	view	might	claim	that	a	wise	
person	knows	that	knowledge	is	fallible	and	that	therefore	one	should	always	
have	the	attitude	of	humility	rather	than	of	arrogance.	It	can	also	be	claimed	
that	a	wise	person	knows	which	things	she	knows	for	certain	(i.e.	which	of	her	
beliefs	are	justified	and	true)	and	restrains	from	claiming	to	know	anything	
that	falls	out	of	the	domain	she	knows	well.
Insisting	 on	 epistemic	 humility	 is	 praise	 worthy,	 particularly	 if	 contrasted	
with	epistemic	arrogance.	Epistemic	humility	is	important	as	a	character	trait,	
in	that	 it	makes	one	cautious	in	how	one	exercises	one’s	epistemic	agency.	
Being	open	minded	about	other	people’s	viewpoints,	arguments	and	evidence	
rather	than	arrogantly	assuming	that	one	is	always	right	certainly	invites	not	
only	epistemic	but	ethical	praise	as	well.	It	is	also	important	in	the	epistemol-
ogy,	in	that	it	makes	one	more	careful	in	forming	judgments.	Peter	Unger	has	
warned	us	against	taking	dogmatic	attitude	toward	things	and	the	attitude	of	
epistemic	humility	is	nice	modus operandi	on	how	to	achieve	it.	But,	it	is	hard	
to	see	how	epistemic	humility	(whether	as	a	character	trait	or	as	an	attitude)	is	
in	itself	sufficient	to	make	someone	wise.	If	A	and	B	are	epistemically	hum-
ble,	but	A	has	all	sorts	of	knowledge	about	various	areas	of	life	and	knows	
how	to	live	well,	and	B	is	ignorant	on	most	things	and	has	no	clear	conception	
of	how	life	should	be	lived	well,	 intuition	says	that	A’s	cognitive	economy	
and	his	ways	of	exercising	his	epistemic	agency	are	somehow	better	that	B’s.	
Though	both	are	humble,	B	lacks	something	and	it	is	probable	that	what	B	
lacks	is	wisdom.
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	at	least	possible	that	one	can	be	wise	even	if	one	is	not	
humble.	Let’s	say	that	one	was	always	lucky	in	a	sense	that	his	viewpoints,	
arguments,	and	evidence	really	were	good	and	correct,	perhaps	because	they	
were	formed	reliably	or	because	one	simply	is	extremely	smart	and	competent	
in	 reaching	 knowledge.	Then,	 had	 he	 been	 humble	 and	 perhaps	 restrained	
15
A	 nice	 overview	 was	 provided	 by	 Sharon	
Ryan	(2012);	I	will	rely	on	her	classification	
here.
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from	sticking	to	his	knowledge,	he	would	end	up	not	knowing.	We	can	think	
here	of	the	character	of	doctor	House	from	the	famous	television	show.	Leav-
ing	aside	the	question	of	whether	he	was	wise,	the	fact	remains	that	he	was	
competent	and	reliable	in	his	knowledge	(which	was	the	result	of	what	Pritch-
ard	would	call	one’s	ability)	and	he	was	acting	upon	it	to	save	lives.	Had	he	
been	humbler,	and	listened	to	those	who	objected	him,	certainly	some	of	his	
patients	would	die.	So	the	attitude	of	arrogance	can	sometimes	be	a	better	way	
to	go.	The	problem	then	is,	how	to	know	which	situations	ask	for	humility	and	
which	for	arrogance.	Knowing	when	to	be	humble	and	when	to	stick	to	one’s	
gun	might	just	be	one	important	aspect	of	wisdom,	rather	than	being	humble	
all	the	time.
Being	wise	can	also	mean	knowing	a	lot,	according	to	the	wisdom as knowl­
edge	view.	This	knowledge	may	consist	in	having	theoretical	knowledge	(as	
explained	by	Aristotle’s	account	of	sophia)	or	in	having	practical	knowledge	
(as	 captured	by	Aristotle’s	phronesis).	Theoretical	knowledge	 in	 this	 sense	
includes	self-knowledge,	knowledge	of	the	world	and	other	people,	as	well	as	
knowledge	of	what	is	truly	important.	Some	philosophers	would	also	include	
here	understanding,	specified	as	knowledge	of	the	casual	connections	that	ex-
ist	in	the	world,	as	well	as	understanding	of	some	fundamental	philosophical	
concerns.	On	this	view,	our	House	character	is	wise:	he	has	extensive	knowl-
edge	about	people,	medicine,	religion,	psychological	reactions	of	people,	he	
understands	how	things	hang	 together	as	well	as	why	people	do	what	 they	
do	and	how	they	react	to	things,	given	their	character,	motivations,	beliefs,	
preferences,	etc.	What	is	most	often	objected	to	this	view	is	the	lack	of	any	ad-
ditional	condition,	beside	knowledge,	for	being	wise.	In	the	previous	chapter	
we	saw	that	some	are	willing	to	negate	the	distinctive	value	of	understanding	
because	 it	wasn’t	clear	how	it	differs	 from	having	more	knowledge;	 in	 the	
case	of	wisdom	as	lots	of	knowledge,	it	is	even	more	problematic.	Therefore,	
the	idea	is,	something	needs	to	be	done	with	this	knowledge,	in	the	sense	that	
it	is	put	to	good	use	for	the	person	who	has	it.	Again	inspired	by	Aristotle,	
some	philosophers	claim	that	being	wise	is	closely	connected	to	living	well,	
to	making	 one’s	 life	 good.	Therefore,	 any	 theory	 of	wisdom,	 on	 the	 third	
view,	should	necessary	take	into	consideration	the	intuitive	idea	that	wisdom	
is	somehow	connected	to	the	practical	side	of	us:	deciding	how	to	live	and	
what	to	do.	Ryan	terms	this	as	wisdom	as	knowledge and living well view:
“Many	practical	theories	of	wisdom	focus	on	not	only	knowing	how	to	live	well,	but	on	how	we	
apply	what	we	now	and	how	we	actually	live	out	our	lives.	When	we	do	it	well,	by	taking	the	
long	view	on	things,	knowing	what	is	worth	worrying	about	and	what	we	should	just	shrug	off	
and	move	on	from,	knowing	how	best	to	spend	our	time	and	effort,	etc.,	we	achieve	wisdom.”	
(Ryan	2012,	p.	103)
It	seems	that	any	theory	of	wisdom	is	somehow	divided	between	taking	into	
consideration	theoretical	aspect	of	wisdom,	and	the	idea	of	being	practically	
wise.	Ryan	 suggests	 that	 the	 problem	with	 philosophical	 construction	 of	 a	
theory	of	wisdom	is	in	not	being	able	to	balance	the	two,	in	that	one	either	
ends	up	putting	too	much	emphasis	on	theoretical	or	on	practical	aspect.	On	
her	latest	view
“A	wide	and	deep	variety	of	well-grounded,	rational	beliefs	in	basic	academic	subjects	such	as	
philosophy,	science,	literature,	history,	etc.	are	essential	for	wisdom.	Someone	who	has	not	had	
the	privilege	of	a	well-rounded	education	[by	which	she	means	being	exposed	to	and	understand	
the	big	ideas	and	questions]	may	be	quite	intelligent,	might	be	living	well,	and	may	well	be	a	
person	to	admire	and	consult	on	wide	variety	of	issues,	but	he	or	she	is	not	informed	enough	to	
count	as	wise.”	(Ryan	2012,	p.	103)
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Practical	wisdom	is	not	enough,	Ryan	argues,	because	it	neglects	the	effort	
one	has	to	put	into	achieving	wisdom:
“Wisdom	is	difficult	to	achieve,	in	part,	because	of	all	the	investigation,	reading,	thinking,	stud-
ying,	analyzing,	and	learning	it	requires.”	(Ibid.,	p.	104)
Because	of	the	active	involvement	on	the	part	of	the	cognizer	to	achieve	wis-
dom,	it	is	claimed	that	wisdom	is	the	prime	epistemic	good,	the	most	valuable	
state	one	can	reach.	Baehr	characterizes	theoretical	wisdom	partly	as	“a	kind	
of	personal	intellectual	ability	or	competence	that	is	aimed	at”	(Baehr	2012,	
p.	89).	This	suggests	that	an	active	engagement	on	the	part	of	the	cognizer	is	
necessary	for	wisdom	to	be	achieved.	It	also	suggests	that	wisdom	(i.e.	the	
desire,	and	the	effort	put	into	becoming	wise)	is	a	lifelong	process,	and	like	
understanding,	wisdom	is	a	sort	of	achievement	that	comes	in	degrees	and	is	
susceptible	to	constant	growth	and	improvement.
Being	wise	is	an	epistemic	good;	but	it	is	also	a	virtue.	In	fact,	out	of	many	
different	proposals	on	how	exactly	to	classify	wisdom,	it	seems	that	the	most	
promising	line	is	to	see	wisdom	as	a	kind	of	intellectual	virtue,	a	chief	intel-
lectual	virtue	that	governs	our	intellectual	conduct.	Roberts	and	Wood	(2007),	
Ryan	(2012),	and	Miščević	(2012)	are	among	philosophers	who	offered	such	
accounts.	Ryan	classifies	her	view	as	“Deep	Rationality”	theory	of	wisdom	
and	claims	that	it	incorporates	the	following	three	conditions:
(1)	 S	has	a	wide	variety	of	epistemically	justified	beliefs	on	a	wide	variety	of	
valuable	academic	subjects	and	on	how	to	live	rationally	(epistemically,	
morally,	and	practically).
(2)	 S	has	very	few	unjustified	beliefs	and	is	sensitive	to	his	or	her	limitations.
(3)	 S	is	deeply	committed	to	both:
(a)	 acquiring	 a	 wider,	 deeper,	 and	 more	 rational	 beliefs	 about	 reality	
(subjects	listed	in	condition	1)
(b)	 living	rationally	(practically,	emotionally,	and	morally)16
Inspired	mostly	by	Ernest	Sosa’s	theory	of	knowledge,	Nenad	Miščević	(2012)	
offers	 the	most	 elaborate	 theory	of	wisdom,	 a	 “Virtue-Theoretic	Proposal”,	
according	to	which	understanding	(defined	as	a	 type	of	knowledge,	namely	
knowledge	of	casual	dependencies)	is	an	important	element	of	wisdom.	Unfor-
tunately,	I	cannot	go	into	details	regarding	Miščević’s	account,	but	I	strongly	
recommend	it,	given	that	I	think	it	is	the	most	promising	way	in	which	to	think	
of	the	connection	between	knowledge,	understanding,	and	wisdom,	and	in	that	
it	offers	a	coherent	view	on	the	value	of	knowledge	and	the	way	it	connects	
to	epistemic	virtues.	Another	aspect	of	Miščević’s	theory	is	the	way	in	which	
he	incorporates	Nozick’s	account	into	a	more	elaborate	and	refined	account	
of	what	it	means	to	be	wise.	Here,	however,	it	is	important	to	note	a	two	level	
account	of	wisdom	he	offers.	The	first	level	of	wisdom	–	basic	wisdom	–
“…	encompasses	primarily	phronesis	generated	motivation	and,	on	the	factual	theoretical	side,	
casual-dispositional	knowledge	of	oneself	and	of	other	people,	in	particular,	group-focused	and	
general,	and	as	much	information	about	the	world	as	is	needed	for	 the	good	life.”	(Miščević	
2012,	p.	135)
The	second	level	–	reflective	wisdom–	is	thought	of	as	a	kind	of	meta-ethical	
level	where	one	is	asked	to	reflect	on	the	first	level	commitments	and	to	try	to	
16
Ryan	 2012,	 p.	 108.	 Ryan’s	 account	 is	 spe-
cific	 in	 that	 she	doesn’t	 see	knowledge	as	 a	
requirement	for	wisdom,	only	that	person	has	
justified	 beliefs.	 Condition	 (2)	 captures	 the	
key	elements	of	epistemic	virtue	of	humility.
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balance	them	out,	and	to	adjust	them	to	novel	situations.	It	is	here	that	more	
practical	aspect	of	wisdom	is	revealed,	the	one	connected	to	how	one	lives	
and	comports	in	his	life,	rather	than	to	what	one	knows.
One	final	theory	of	wisdom	that	I	find	particularly	revealing	is	the	one	pro-
posed	by	Jason	Baehr	(2012),	who	provides	elaborate	accounts	of	theoretical,	
as	well	as	practical	wisdom.	Both	he	and	Miščević	are	close	in	claiming	that	
wisdom	incorporates	a	special	kind	of	understanding	of	relevant	subject	mat-
ters,	and	they	both	claim	that	wisdom	is	involved	in	making	the	right	choices	
in	 the	 courses	 of	 one’s	 life,	where	 these	 are	 enabled	 by	 one’s	 understand-
ing	of	the	relevant	aspects	of	situations,	choices,	dilemmas,	character	traits,	
etc.	According	to	Baehr’s	classification,	theoretical	wisdom	incorporates	two	
further	distinctions.	It	can	be	thought	of	as	an	ideal	epistemic	state	character-
ized	by	deep	explanatory	understanding	of	epistemically	significant	subject	
matters,	and	as	a	competence,	that	is,	a	personal	intellectual	ability	to	reliably	
identify	choice-worthy	ends.	Similarly,	practical	wisdom	also	 includes	 two	
aspects.	Trait	conception	classifies	practical	wisdom	as	knowing	how	to	live	
well,	where	this	involves	willingness	to	conduct	in	that	manner,	as	well	as	the	
know-how	conception,	according	 to	which	a	cognizer	 is	good	at	balancing	
competing	values	and	applying	moral	principles	to	new	situations.
Plenty	of	issues	are	left	for	epistemologists	to	answer	regarding	wisdom.	At	
the	moment,	a	rather	interesting	debate	is	going	on	concerning	with	the	claim	
that	being	wise	implies	being	ethically	good	–	some	philosophers	have	raised	
interesting	points	regarding	with	wise	yet	morally	corrupted	people	who	act	
only	for	their	own	interests.	Another	relevant	discussion	is	finding	the	proper	
balance	between	intellectual	and	ethical	aspects	of	wisdom	and	its	motiva-
tional	force.	Does	knowing	what	is	good,	what	should	be	done,	what	is	wise	
to	do	automatically	make	demand	on	one	to	do	so?	Is	there	room	for	weak-
ness	of	will,	or	for	intentionally	making	a	mistake?	And	finally,	given	how	
strongly	epistemologists	insist	on	the	connection	between	being	wise	and	liv-
ing	a	good	life,	more	needs	to	be	said	about	what	good	life	is.	Always	doing	
the	right	 thing	(as	Ryan’s	account	seems	to	suggest)	might	 leave	one	wise,	
perfectly	moral	and	completely	unhappy;	epistemologists	need	to	(in	co-op-
eration	with	psychologist	and	moral	philosophers)	provide	an	explanation	of	
the	connection	between	wisdom	and	happiness.
But	what	is	important	for	our	discussion	here	is	that	wisdom	makes	a	special	
use	of	self-knowledge	and	I’d	like	to	insist	on	this	aspect.	Being	wise	means	
knowing	how	to	learn	from	one’s	experiences	and	how	to	protect	oneself	from	
life’s	hardships.	It	also	means	learning	from	the	experiences	of	others,	so	as	
to	avoid	making	mistakes	that	others	have	done.	In	addition	to	knowing	when	
to	let	go	and	when	not,	wisdom,	I	suggest,	incorporates	a	great	deal	of	self-
knowledge	and	self-understanding	not	only	in	terms	of	one’s	desires,	interests	
and	motives,	but	also	in	terms	of	coping	with	the	consequences	of	one’s	ac-
tions.	Macbeth	might	be	a	useful	example	here;	one	thing	that	he	lacked	was	
knowledge	of	what	he	can’t	live	with.	Going	mad	is	at	least	partly	a	result	of	
his	not	being	able	to	predict	how	killing	of	a	king	will	affect	him.
4. Conclusion
I	have	presented	several	accounts	of	understanding	and	several	accounts	of	
wisdom,	 deliberately	 not	 choosing	 ‘my	 favourite’	 among	 them,	 and	 delib-
erately	not	going	into	deep	analysis	or	comparison	of	 them.	My	reason	for	
providing	only	an	overview	is	the	fact	that	I	was	primarily	focused	on	present-
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ing	recent	trends	in	value	driven	epistemology,	with	the	aim	of	showing	the	
importance	of	the	shift	from	monism	to	pluralism.	Monism	in	epistemology	
should	not	be	accepted	because	if	takes	away	the	value	of	epistemic	agency	
that	we	 exhibit.	Who	we	 are	 as	 people	 is	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 determined	 by	
our	 cognitive	 endeavours	 to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 ourselves,	 our	world	 and	
other	people,	and	epistemology	has	to	recognize	that.	In	addition,	I	claimed,	
monism	cannot	explain	cognitive	gain	that	is	evident	in	cases	of	testimonial	
exchange	(where	more	than	knowledge	is	being	transmitted	and	a	listener	can	
deepen	one’s	understanding	or	change	his	perspective	on	things	thus	becom-
ing	practically	and	theoretically	wiser)	or	 in	cases	where	one	feels	one	has	
learned	 from	art	 (in	 the	 sense	 that	 one	 has	 come	 to	 understand	 something	
about	the	psychological	relations	between	people	or	some	other	aspect	of	the	
world	that	art	brings	forward).	Thus	pluralism	simply	fits	better	and	explains	
better	different	cognitive	connections	we	have	with	the	world	and	different	
ways	 in	which	we	 feel	we	have	obtained	 some	kind	of	 cognitive	gain.	By	
insisting	on	the	practical	aspect	of	wisdom	it	can	also	explain	better	than	mon-
ism	why	knowledge	matters.	Though	all	of	 these	claims	need	to	be	further	
analysed	and	supported	by	more	elaborate	research,	I	hope	that	here	I	have	
offered	reasons	to	accept	pluralism.
However,	and	this	is	what	I	now	want	to	claim,	pluralism	should	not	be	seen	
as	a	battlefield	of	various	cognitive	goods.	It	is	not	‘the	winner	takes	it	all’	
story.	Even	 if	wisdom	is	chief	epistemic	good,	and	 the	most	praise-worthy	
character	trait	and	intellectual	virtue,	there’s	still	plenty	of	work	for	knowl-
edge	and	understanding.	From	the	accounts	presented	by	Miščević	and	Baehr,	
it	seems	obvious	that	the	three	goods	work	together.	What	I	want	to	suggest	
at	this	point	is	that	we	should	not	be	considering	these	candidates	as	mutually	
exclusive,	in	the	sense	that	one	is	either	a	distinctive	instance	of	the	other	(un-
derstanding	as	a	special	instance	of	knowledge),	or	that	having	plenty	of	one	
somehow	enables	a	cognizer	to	have	the	other	(having	plenty	of	knowledge	
enables	one	to	be	wise).	My	proposal	is	to	recognize	the	importance	of	each	
of	these,	relevant	to	the	different	areas	of	research	and	different	motives	and	
needs	we	might	have	 for	conducting	our	own	 researches.	 In	 some	circum-
stances,	being	too	reflective	might	cause	one	not	to	react	at	all,	while	in	some	
other	circumstances	one	needs	to	invest	a	proper	amount	of	reflection	before	
one	can	make	one’s	‘cognitive	decision’	on	how	things	are.	Balancing	these	
two	extremes	is	not	always	pleasant,	but	it	is	what	we	are	demanded	to	do.	If	I	
have	doubts	regarding	my	husband’s	fidelity,	then	I	need	to	know	(where	this	
implies	knowing	for	certain,	having	all	the	relevant	evidence	and	appropri-
ate	level	of	justification)	whether	or	not	he	really	committed	adultery.	I	need	
to	know	how	things	are.	If	we	are	in	the	middle	of	a	marital	crisis,	I	need	to	
understand	the	reasons	that	brought	us	to	this	point.	And	if	we	are	contem-
plating	a	divorce,	I	need	to	be	wise	about	whether	or	not	the	marriage	is	worth	
fighting	for	or	letting	go	is	the	solution	I	ought	to	embrace,	so	as	to	ensure	
more	prosperous	 life	 later	 on,	 after	 the	heartache	 is	 gone.	 In	 the	 first	 case	
(knowing	about	his	potential	affair)	I	need	to	be	absolutely	certain	about	his	
behaviour	and	whereabouts	(perhaps	even	his	disposition	to	act	in	that	way)	
in	order	to	be	certain	whether	or	not	he	was	unfaithful.	Notice	that	in	some	
other	circumstances	the	demands	to	be	certain	need	not	be	so	high	–	if	I	want	
to	know	what	time	it	is,	all	I	need	is	a	reliable	informer	or	a	properly	running	
watch.	In	the	second	case,	knowing	that	we	are	in	trouble	is	not	enough	to	
find	the	solution;	ideally,	we	need	to	know	why	and	how	we	got	to	this	point,	
i.e.	we	need	to	understand	what	brought	this	on	us,	how	the	interplay	of	our	
characters	and	motives	(needs,	desires	and	other	things	that	might	be	relevant	
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for	sustaining	a	compatible	relation)	and	external	circumstances	(demanding	
and	time-consuming	work	schedules,	financial	issues)	worked	together,	and	
influenced	each	other	to	bring	us	to	where	we	are.	The	more	I	know	about	
these	things	the	better,	but	without	understanding	this	particular	kind	of	inter-
play,	I	will	not	have	a	fully	cognitively	satisfying	grasp	of	why	our	marriage	
came	to	this	point.	And	in	the	third	case,	understanding	what	brought	this	on	
is	not	enough	to	make	a	decision	regarding	my	future	action,	being	wise	in	the	
sense	outlined	above	is	needed	to	go	on.	So	the	point	is,	the	relation	between	
knowledge,	understanding	and	wisdom	is	not	that	of	dominance	of	one	over	
the	others	but	of	cooperation	and	integration.17
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Epistemička igra prijestolja
Sažetak
Cilj je ovoga rada skroman: želim ponuditi osvrt na neke od najnovijih razvoja u epistemolo­
giji, okarakteriziranih posebnim pomakom koji se nazire već neko vrijeme. Pomak je najlakše 
objasniti kao napuštanje tradicionalne, monističke slike (prema kojoj je znanje jedino važno 
postignuće u pokušaju da spoznajno zahvatimo svijet) i prihvaćanje pluralizma (prema kojemu 
postoje i drugi važni spoznajni dosezi prema kojima bismo trebali ustrajati, ponajviše razumije-
vanje i mudrost). Jedan od najvažnijih aspekata toga pomaka pitanje je koje spoznajno stanje 
nasljeđuje znanje kao vrhovnu epistemičku vrijednost i taj će me aspekt najviše zanimati. Tvrdit 
ću da pluralistička slika bolje odgovara našem spoznajnom susretanju sa svijetom, s drugim 
ljudima i sa samima sobom. U tome smislu, umjesto da navijamo za to da postoji neka jedna 
vrijednost koja će se nalaziti na epistemičkom tronu, trebali bismo uvažiti nezamjenjiv doprinos 
svake od tih vrijednosti našim nastojanjima da shvatimo tko smo i s našim iskustvom svijeta.
Ključne riječi
znanje,	epistemički	monizam,	epistemički	pluralizam,	razumijevanje,	mudrost
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Iris Vidmar
Epistemisches Spiel der Throne
Zusammenfassung
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist bescheiden: Ich möchte einen Rückblick auf einige der letzten Ent­
wicklungen innerhalb der Epistemologie halten, die durch eine besondere Verschiebung ge­
kennzeichnet sind, welche bereits seit einiger Zeit durchschimmert. Diese Verschiebung wird am 
eingängigsten erklärt als eine Abkehr von der traditionellen, monistischen Vorstellung (wonach 
das Wissen die einzige bedeutende Errungenschaft ist, in unserem Versuch, die Welt erkenntnis­
mäßig zu erfassen) und die Anerkenntnis des Pluralismus (nach dem auch andere belangreiche 
erkenntnismäßige Leistungen bestehen, die wir anvisieren sollten – zumeist sind dies Verständ­
nis und Weisheit. Einer der wichtigsten Aspekte dieser Verschiebung ist die Frage, welche Er­
kenntnislage das Wissen als den obersten epistemischen Wert erbt, und dieser Aspekt wird mein 
Interesse am stärksten erregen. Ich werde behaupten, dass das pluralistische Bild besser ge­
eignet ist für unsere erkenntnisbezogene Begegnung mit der Welt, mit anderen Menschen sowie 
mit sich selbst. In diesem Sinne, anstatt die Option zu favorisieren, dass es den einen Wert gibt, 
welcher den epistemischen Thron besteigen wird, sollten wir den unersetzlichen Beitrag jedes 
Einzelnen von uns akzeptieren, in seiner Anstrengung, sich damit zu versöhnen, wer wir sind 
und was für Welterfahrungen wir gemacht haben.
Schlüsselwörter
Wissen,	epistemischer	Monismus,	epistemischer	Pluralismus,	Verständnis,	Weisheit
Iris Vidmar
Le jeu épistémique des trônes
Résumé
Le but de ce travail est modeste : je souhaite exposer un compte rendu de certains progrès ré­
cents en épistémologie, caractérisés par un déplacement particulier qui se profile depuis déjà 
un certain temps. La manière la plus évidente d’expliquer ce déplacement est de le voir comme 
abandon de l’image traditionnelle, monistique (selon laquelle le savoir est la seule acquisition 
importante dans la tentative de saisir le monde d’un point de vue de la connaissance) et d’ac­
cepter le pluralisme (selon lequel il existe d’autres significations pour la connaissance sur la 
base desquelles nous devrions persévérer, spécialement dans la compréhension et la sagesse). 
L’un des aspects les plus importants de ce déplacement est la question de savoir quel est l’état 
de la connaissance dont hérite le savoir en tant que valeur épistémique suprême, et c’est bien 
cet aspect qui va le plus m’intéresser. J’affirmerai que l’image de pluralité convient mieux à no­
tre rencontre avec le monde, avec les autres et avec nous­même d’un point de vue de la connais­
sance. En ce sens, au lieu d’encourager l’idée qu’il n’existe qu’une seule et unique valeur qui 
va se trouver sur le trône épistémique, nous devrions accepter l’irremplaçable contribution 
de chacun de nous dans le but de nous réconcilier avec qui nous sommes et avec comment est 
constitué notre expérience du monde constituée. 
Mots-clés
savoir,	monisme	épistémique,	pluralisme	épistémique,	compréhension,	sagesse
